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Abstract: - Using European and Asian banks, this paper investigates how differences in culture in different 
countries can be related with Loan loss provisions (LLP) based on the Hofstede’s theory. The effect of the 
application of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) on the amount of LLP recognized in 
financial statements published by Banks is also under analysis. Findings suggest that some culture dimensions 
play a role when analyzing risk factors, but not in all situations. When scores based on characteristics and 
behavior attributable to national culture are conflicting, the influence of culture on loan loss provisions is 
rejected.  However, the application of IFRSs (vs local GAAP) has an important role, changing the power of 
national culture to influence the levels of LLP in countries where the scores of culture dimensions are 
according to the theory, and mitigating that influence when the scores are conflicting, moderating the amount of 
LLP that Banks should report regardless of culture behavior.  
 
 
Key-Words: Loan loss provisions; Banking industry; Hofstede’ culture dimensions; IFRS 
 
1 Introduction 
Accounting scholars, policy-makers and a wide 
range of researchers have been for long periods 
recognizing that credit risk is one of the most 
important risk factor for the banking industry. The 
amount of loans is an important asset for banks, 
assuming the claim to reimbursements and related 
interest. When this principle is not respected by 
borrowers the credit relationship is weakened, and 
the economic and the financial performance of 
banks come reduced. Banking and accounting 
regulators are accompanying this phenomenon with 
attention, especially when the financial crisis 
started. To face that risk banks set up reserves 
(allowances) through loan losses provisions. 
Theoretically speaking, LLP are anticipations of a 
prospective loss on a loan account. 
Prior research found that managers use LLP for 
income smoothing [1], for meeting restrictions 
imposed by debt covenants [2], for mandatory 
capital requirements or to manage earnings [3][4] 
[5][6][7], to better dispose of securities [8][9][10] 
[11][12], for signaling [10], among other 
incentives. A related set of studies also focuses on 
the determinants of loan loss provisions. Loan 
quality and economic conditions ([13], loan growth 
[14], Bank size [15], accounting specific factors 
[16][17],  asset risk, capital adequacy ratios and 
pre-loan loss profits [6] as well as macroeconomics 
factors [18][19][20][14][16][17] are some of the 
conditions and factors appointed by well-established 
literature. 
A recent study by Dahl [21] found that target 
levels of provisions for banks in different categories 
(small/big banks, commercial/real estate/consumer 
loan concentration, and high/low capital ratios) are 
established on the basis of a compromise among 
reporting preferences of bankers, accountants and 
regulators. Balla and McKenna [22] justified that 
bankers want flexibility, accountant setters look for 
transparency, and regulators desire safety and 
soundness. LLP are, thus, a consequence of 
prudential rules imposed by national monetary 
authorities (e.g., central banks), international 
monetary authorities (e.g., Basel agreements) and 
accounting setters (e.g., international or local 
standards). The amount of LLP can also have an 
impact on bank capital ratios, which, in turns, may 
be subject to changes through time, for several 
reasons, including changes in Basel standards, world 
economic conditions and public policies [17]. 
Besides the extensive literature previously 
referred, it is hard to find studies exploring the 
National Culture of a country as a factor to explain 
the amount of LLP presented by Banks. One 
exception is the recent empirical research of 
Kanagaretnam, Kim and Lobo [23] that used 
Hofstede’s culture dimensions theory to observe its 
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influence on accounting conservatism and risk 
taking in the banking industry. An extensive 
literature also used Hofstede’s culture dimensions to 
examine its influence on business environments and 
accounting [24][25], in economics [26] and in 
finance [27] among others authors and business 
areas. Particularly, national culture was used in 
studies on development of accounting systems [28] 
[29], on earnings management in several industries 
except banking [30] [31], on accounting 
conservatism [25] [32] [33] [34]. A survey 
accompanied in early 2008 by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit on the factors that created 
conditions for the recent Banking crises [35] also 
reveals that around 73% of survey participants 
identified “culture and excessive risk-taking” as 
their major causes.   
Our paper is most closely related to 
Kanagaretnam et al [10] [23] and can be considered 
as an emerging or complementary body of empirical 
research investigating how national culture affect 
loan losses provisions across countries in the 
banking industry. Usually banks are excluded from 
other studies [30] [31] but loan loss accounting in 
this industry is a proper setting to observe the 
preferences of managers for conservative 
accounting [36]. I use two dimensions of national 
culture identified by Hofstede (2001), namely, 
individualism (IDV) and uncertainty avoidance 
(UA) to relate with accounting conservatism and 
risk-taking. These two dimensions were used by, 
Kanagaretnam et al. [23] and Chen et al. [37], 
among others. Findings show that: i) banks in 
countries less individualists and more adverse to 
risk report earnings more conservatively and exhibit 
lower levels of risk-taking than banks in higher 
individualist and more risky countries [23]; ii) 
individualism is significantly negatively correlated 
with corporate cash holdings and uncertainty-
avoidance is positively correlated with corporate 
cash holdings [37]. My paper adds to [23]. First, I 
create a new dataset with European and Asian 
countries and based on Hofstede’s culture 
dimensions I split those countries whose scores for 
individualism are similar to the scores of risk 
avoidance. Second, I use this database to analyze if 
the effect of national culture is moderated by the 
application of International Financial Accounting 
Standards (IFRSs) instead of local standards (local 
GAAP).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the arguments for which culture 
dimensions can influence accounting conservatism 
and risk-taking in the banking industry and why 
IFRSs are important to industry banking and loan 
loss provisions. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 presents the research data and design, and 
results are reported in chapter 5. Chapter 6 
concludes. 
 
 
2 The influence of national culture on loan 
losses provisions, the application of IFRS and 
hypotheses 
 
2.1 National Culture 
Hofstede´s cultural dimension theory, published in 
2001, offers a framework for cross-cultural 
comparisons that has been widely used in several 
fields as a paradigm for research.   Each country is 
scored using a scale of roughly 0 to 100 for each 
dimension. The higher the score, the more that 
dimension is exhibited in society. 
Prior works applying this theory to earnings 
management, conservatism accounting and risk 
taken [31] [10] [23] found consistent results for 
Individualism (IDV) and Uncertainty/Avoidance 
Index (UAI), demonstrating that individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance dimensions of national 
culture affect risk-taking. I will also use these two 
dimensions. 
According to theory, IDV measures the degree to 
which individuals are integrated into groups 
(without political meaning). Countries with high 
scores for IDV dimension, usually foster contractual 
relationships that are based on the principles of 
exchange, value independence and self-sufficiency, 
place self-interests above collective interests, enjoy 
challenges and expect rewards for hard work, and 
accept confrontation as an attribute (Hofstede, 
2001). With low scores for IDV, countries behave 
according to social norms that are designed to 
maintain social harmony among members of an in-
group, and consider implications of their actions for 
wider collective and share resources, and are 
prepared to sacrifice personal interest for collective 
interests (Hofstede, 2001). It can be argued that risk-
taking incentives are likely greater in High IND 
societies where worry for other stakeholders’ 
welfare is likely to be low [23]. 
The UAI measures the degree to which members 
of a society are able to cope with the uncertainty of 
the future without experiencing undue stress. Weak 
UAI is characterized, among others, by risk taking, 
flexibility, organizations with a relatively low 
degree of structure and few rules. Strong UAI is, by 
opposite, characterized by avoidance of risk, 
organizations that have clearly delineated structures, 
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many written rules, standardized procedures, and 
respect for authority (Hofstede, 2001).  
These two dimensions of culture can be applied 
to our study in the following way. There is evidence 
[24] that banks take more risk in societies where 
IDV is high or UAI is low. Considering LLP as a 
proxy risk-taking, it is expected that banks in low 
IDV and high UAI societies recognize more 
conservative (i.e., larger) allowances for loan losses 
than banks in high IDV and low UAI societies. I 
will test this effect in an income statement item, the 
loan provision expensed in each year, since every 
time a bank increase loan loss allowances it records 
an expense and thus net income decreases.  
A summary of these effects is presented in table 
1, showing that geographies with a high score in 
IDV and a low score in UAI are more committed 
with risk-taking strategies, which in turns give us an 
expectation of a negative or a positive relation with 
LLP.  
 
TABLE 1: The effect of Individualism and 
Uncertainty/Avoidance Index on Risk-taking 
Scores IDV UAI 
High • More 
risk-
taking 
• Less risk-
taking 
Low • Less risk-
taking 
• More risk-
taking 
  
 
2.2 International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) 
A lot of countries around the world have either fully 
adopted, or are considering to adopt, IFRSs. These 
include all member countries of the European Union 
and several other European and Asian countries. 
While many researches analyze the effect of the 
adoption of IFRSs excluding the impact on financial 
institutions, I consider that some issues must be 
highlighted by banks when adopting those IFRSs. 
IFRSs can have a significant impact on the 
banking and capital markets industry. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers [38] anticipated in 2006 
that this impact could include changes on earnings 
and capital volatility, on strategic and financial 
planning, on capital management, on credit 
evaluation tools, and on debt covenants, among 
others. One of the topics that is underlying all these 
impacts is the “Provision for Loan Losses”, since 
this amount must be based upon the requirements of 
central Banks of each country, setting the minimum 
provisions to be held against lending assets. At the 
same time, some countries apply the Basel accords 
(I, II and III) to identify and fulfill some capital 
adequacy ratios, market liquidity tests and stress 
tests. Thus, banks that are listed in European stock 
exchanges have been mandated to compile their 
consolidated financial statements according to 
IFRSs (since 2005) and to compile with Basel II for 
capital requirements (since 2007). Under these 
considerations, two kinds of provisions can be 
addressed: i) the specific provision, that is directly a 
correction of a single loan; ii) the general provision, 
that includes group impairments recognized 
whenever observable data display a measurable 
decline in estimated future cash flows that cannot 
yet be allocated to a single loan.  
The first case, specific provision, and according 
to the current version of IAS 39 still effective, the  
loan loss provision is the current period expense for 
loan losses recognized in that current period. It is 
reported in the profit or loss statement and likely 
influences the reported earnings of banks. This is 
consistent with the so-called “incurred loss model”, 
since LLP can be created only after the occurrence 
of an impairment trigger event for single financial 
assets. Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas [39] examined 
how the application of the IAS 39 incurred loss 
approach affects the loan losses provisions, 
considered as the main operating accrual item of 
(commercial) banks. They found that IAS 39 rules 
significantly reduce discretionary behavior, as 
measured by less income smoothing after IFRS 
adoption. They also found that the IFRS adoption 
effect is significantly less pronounced in stricter 
supervisory regimes and in countries with more 
dispersed ownership of banks. The debate around 
changes to IAS 39 and IFRS 9 changed from an 
“incurred loss model” to an “expected credit loss 
model”. The change and the benefits or the cons 
against the transformation from one model to 
another are out of the scope of this research. 
The second case, the general provision, is created 
for loan portfolios that were not subject to a specific 
provision (loans with similar features, e.g., 
collateralization), and requires that banks 
discriminate between the occurrence or not of a 
credit event.  
Banks applying IFRSs and also banks applying 
local GAAP are found in Europe and in Asia. Not 
all of them comply with the Basel arrangements. I 
also want to analyze the influence of culture in loan 
losses provisions, controlling for banks either 
applying IFRSs or not.  
Negative relation  
with LLP 
Positive relation  
with LLP 
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2.3. Hypotheses  
Based on prior literature, I examine whether 
national culture, particularly the characteristics of 
individualism (IDV) and uncertainty/avoidance 
index (UAI), results in an association with risk-
taking through the use of loan loss provisions. I also 
examine whether this association is moderated by 
the application of IFRSs. 
I pattern tests closely to prior studies that seek 
incentives or factors associated with the level of 
LLP presented by Banks (e.g., [16][23] [40] [41] 
[42]). 
The proxies for national culture are 
Individualism (IDV) and Uncertainty/Avoidance 
Index (UAI). Countries belonging to Asia and to 
Europe have different scores for IDV and for UAI 
(Hofstede, 1980, 2001). Figure 1 draws a scatter 
placing European and Asian countries in quadrants 
that allows the comparison between different 
countries considering the pair of values for IDV and 
UAI. For example, United Kingdom is positioned as 
a country with high IDV and low UAI (4th quadrant) 
when compared to Serbia, with low IDV and high 
UAI (1st quadrant). 
Kanagaretnam et al. [23] found that banks in 
countries with low (high) IDV (UAI) scores have an 
opposite relation with LLP when compared to 
countries in high (low) IDV (UAI) scores. This 
seems to be consistent with Hofstede’s theory, since 
countries with the lowest scores for IDV tend to 
have the highest for UAI, and vice-versa.  
 
Figure 1 - Individualism (IDV) and 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) by country and by 
quadrants 
 
 
 
Based on theory, the first hypothesis to be tested 
is based on the influence of IDV and UAI on loan 
loss provisions: 
 
H1: In countries with lower (higher) scores of 
IDV (UAI) banks exhibit a negative (positive) 
association with loan losses provisions. 
 
I expect that the null is rejected (consistent with 
[23]). However, several countries have similar 
scores for both IDV and UAI, as appointed in Figure 
1. To analyze if differences in the influence of 
national culture on LLP are moderated by the 
position of the country in one of the four quadrants 
(1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th) of figure 1, I test another 
hypothesis. The second hypothesis to be tested is 
related with the examination of the effect of national 
culture (IDV and UAI) when banks are from 
countries in which the scores for UAI and IDV 
either high or both low, namely:  
 
H2: When the scores for IDV and UAS are either 
high or both low, the association with loan loss 
provisions is different from low (high) IDV and high 
(low) UAS. 
 
As explained in prior section, the incurred loss 
approach to loan losses provisions were 
implemented by IAS 39 and only existed since 
2005, coincident with the date from which IFRS 
became mandatory for listed companies, including 
those from banking industry. Because the 
compliance with IFRS can be a determinant for the 
amount of LLP presented by banks [39], I test an 
additional hypothesis to figure out if the association 
of national culture is moderated by the application 
of IFRSs as compared to banks that still continue to 
apply local standards. Our third hypothesis is: 
 
H3: The influence of national culture on risk-
taking is different in countries applying IFRSs or 
local standards. 
 
3. Research design and data 
 
3.1 Models for bank risk taking 
The model to test hypothesis 1 (H1) related with the 
influence of national culture on the level of LLP 
presented by banks are adapted from [24] [39] [40]: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼 +
𝛽𝛽3𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜗𝜗𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝜗𝜗𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 +
𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸 + 𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     
 
(1) 
 
 
Where LLP is Loan Loss Provision expensed in 
Income Statement; IDV and UAI are the scores of 
Hofstede’s dimension cultures; BegNPL equals the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High IDV  
& 
High UAI 
Low IDV 
& 
 Low UAI 
Low IDV  
& 
High UAI 
High IDV  
& 
Low UAI 
1st quadrant 2nd quadrant 
3rd quadrant 4th quadrant 
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beginning balance of non-performing loans; ΔNPL 
equals the change in non-performing loans 
(ΔNPLit=NPLit-NPLit-1). All these explanatory 
variables are scaled by the market capitalization of 
equity to avoid scale bias.  
Non-performing loans (beginning and changes) 
are included as mains variable because a represent 
loans that are in default or close to being in default, 
which is (at least theoretically) associated with LLP, 
the dependent variable. Many loans become non-
performing after being in default for 90 days, 
depending on the contract terms, and there is no 
unique definition widely used. If a bank has NPL, it 
shall recognize loans losses provisions (LLP) 
according to the rules of accounting regimes or 
supervisory regulators. Listed Banks in European 
Union are required to apply the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which 
contains specific guideline on how to estimate the 
impairment of financial assets and, consequently, 
the amount of LLP given the amount of NPL.  
The VectorBanks and VectorMacro are a vector 
of specific characteristics of banks and a vector of 
macroeconomic conditions affecting each country, 
respectively. These vectors are included comprising 
several control variables that prior literature found 
could be associated with loan loss provision. 
VectorBanks includes: i) Size (SIZE),  ii) Leverage 
(LEV), iii) Auditors from Big 4 (AUD), because 
LLP come under close scrutiny from bank auditors 
(Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011); iv) cross-
listed banks (XLIST), since a considerable number 
of banks in the sample are cross-listed in other 
European, Asian or US Stock exchanges, and 
accounting quality can be different for these banks 
relative to a matched sample of firms not cross-
listed; and, v) Loan to deposit ratio. 
The VectorMacro is a vector of macroeconomic 
conditions affecting each country. I control for [23]: 
i) creditor rights (CR) and information sharing (IS) 
based on the findings of [43], ii) the degree to which 
law is fairly and effectively enforced in a country 
(ENFORCE), iii) Gross Domestic Product (LGPD) 
since countries with different income levels can be 
subject to sources of volatility affecting bank risk-
taking [20].  
Equation (1) also includes EUROPE as a control 
variable assuming 1 if the bank belongs to a 
European country and 0 if it is an Asian bank, as 
well as year-indicators (YEAR) to control for year 
fixed effects. Details of all the variables are 
presented in Table 2. 
The main prediction is that β1 on IDV will be 
negative and β2 on UAI will be positive based on 
Hofstede’s theory on dimension cultures. We expect 
also positive β3 and positive β4, since European and 
Asian Banks can avoid the growth of LLP if they 
reduce the amount of non-performing loans. By 
other hand, the higher the amount of NPL, the 
higher the risk-taking of each bank, given its 
decision to grant (or not) credit to other parties after 
analyzing the probability of default of each 
borrower.  
To test Hypothesis 2, I do the following. Firstly, 
I create a 2x2matrix of four subsamples partitions. I 
split all countries according to the pairs {IDV, UAI} 
and create four groups according to figure 1: i) 1st 
Quadrant, for the pairs low IDV and high UAI; ii) 
2nd Quadrant, for the pairs high IDV and high UAI; 
iii) 3rd Quadrant, for the pairs with low IDV and low 
UAI; and iv) 4th Quadrant, for the pairs with high 
IDV and low UAI. 
Secondly, the Equation (1) is then applied to 1st 
and 4th Quadrants, and then to 2nd and 3rd, since in 
these later the scores of national culture are 
conflicting. There are countries with both IDV and 
UAI high and countries with both IDV and UAI 
low. 
 
TABLE 2: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent: 
LLP Loan Loss Provisions: the amount of provisions at the end of the year divided by market capitalization 
Independent: 
IDV Score for individualism from Hofstede (2001)  
UAI Score for uncertainty/avoidance index from Hofstede (2001)  
BegNPL Begging Balance of Non-Performing Loans divided by market capitalization 
ΔNPL Change in Non-Performing loans at the end of year t minus Non-Performing loans at the end of year t-1 
IFRS 1 if bank-year is applying IFRS; 0 otherwise 
                                                                                                        (cont.) 
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                                                                                                        (cont.) 
HIGH 1 if the country has high IDV and high UAI scores; 0 otherwise 
LOW 1 if the country has low IDV and low UAI scores; 0 otherwise 
HighIDV 1 if the country has high IDV and low UAI; 0 otherwise 
LowIDV 1 if the country has low IDV and high UAI; 0 otherwise 
Controls - Bank Specific: 
Size Log of total assets 
LEV Total debt divided by total assets at the end of the year 
AUD 1 if the bank is audited by a Big4; 0 otherwise 
XLIST 1 if the bank is listed in more than one stock exchange; 0 otherwise 
LTD Ratio Loan-to-deposits 
Controls - Macro and country specific: 
CR 
Index aggregating creditor rights,ranging from 0 to 4,  used in [23] and originally included in [44] and 
updated in [45] 
IS Information sharing index equaling 1 if either a public registry or a private bureau operates in the country and 0 otherwise, used [23] and originally [45] 
LGPD Log of GPD per capita, used in [23] and originally from World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance database 
ENFORCE Law enforcement index ranging from 0 (lower) to 10 (greater law enforcement), used by [23] and originally from the Economic Freedom of the World: 2010 Annual Report.  
EUROPE 1 for European countries and 0 for Asian countries 
 
So, according to the theory, a country with high 
IDV must have low UAI if conclusions about the 
impact on LLP want to be addressed. It is important 
to understand what happens if the scores are similar 
(either high or low). 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) is tested adding a new dummy 
variable, IFRS, assuming 1 (0) for bank-year 
observations applying IFRSs (local GAAP). 
Equation (2) is adapted from Equation (1), as 
follows: 
  
         𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼 +
𝛿𝛿3𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆+𝛿𝛿4𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼+𝛿𝛿5𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗𝑈𝑈
𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼+𝛿𝛿6𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛿𝛿7∆𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾
𝛾𝛾𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜗𝜗𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝜗𝜗𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾+𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸+
𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸+𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
 
(2) 
 
 
 
The interaction terms IFRS*IDV and IFRS*UAI are 
our main variable of interest. They will also be 
tested after the split of the sample into four 
Quadrants, fitting together 1st and 4th, and then 2nd 
and 3rd, similarly to Equation (1). No predictions are 
made. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
Using Thomson Reuters Database (datastream), I 
extract data on all European and Asian listed banks 
for which data in Worlscope was available. These 
two large geographies are of main concern because 
of the interests and development of economies such  
 
 
as China, Russian Federation, and  European  
Union, with a diversity of countries distinguished by  
different type of societies. The culture dimension 
measures, IDV and UAI, were obtained on cultural 
database in the Hofstede Centre website 
(http://geert-hofstede.com/). Other country-level 
institutional variables are obtained from 
Kanagaretnam et al (2014) and related literature. 
The sample starts out with 43 countries, but 
Ukraine and Cyprus were excluded because these 
two countries are not included in the Hofstede´s 
cultures measures. For the remaining 41 countries, I 
downloaded all the bank-years between 2005 and 
2012, which yielded a population of 594 banks and 
4,159 bank-years observations. I loss 126 banks and 
884 bank-years due to lack of information on the 
Database for all the variables needed. I also 
removed all the observations with studentized 
residuals higher than |2|. Bangladesh, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Malta and Vietnam 
were dropped. 
The final sample consists of a maximum of 2,392 
bank-years observations, split between 12 Asian 
countries with 1,529 bank-years observations and 23 
European countries with 863 bank-years 
observations About 82% (n=1,250) of the total 
Asian bank-years observations (n= 1,529) use local 
standards and around 83% (n=715) of the total 
European bank-years (n=863) apply IFRS. Table 3 
displays information with the list of countries 
included in the sample and a set of institutional 
variables assigned to them. 
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Table 3 – Sample Description 
Country Asia (0) or Europe (1) IDV UAI CR IS ENFORCE 
Austria 1 55 70 3 1 6.70 
0Belgium 1 75 94 2 1 5.60 
China 0 20 30 2 0 6.73 
Croatia 1 33 80 3 0 5.40 
Denmark 1 74 23 3 1 6.19 
Finland 1 63 59 1 1 8.06 
France 1 71 86 0 1 6.91 
Germany 1 67 65 3 1 6.62 
Greece 1 35 100 1 1 4.13 
Hong Kong 0 25 29 4 1 7.69 
Hungary 1 80 82 1 1 7.15 
India 0 48 40 2 0 2.59 
Ireland 1 70 35 1 1 4.95 
Israel 0 54 81 3 1 3.46 
Italy 1 76 75 2 1 3.18 
Japan 0 46 92 2 1 6.37 
Lithuania 1 60 65 2 1 7.45 
Malaysia 0 26 36 3 1 4.27 
Netherlands 1 80 53 3 1 5.11 
Norway 1 69 50 2 1 7.53 
Pakistan 0 14 70 1 1 3.55 
Philippines 0 32 44 1 1 3.42 
Poland 1 60 93 1 0 4.27 
Portugal 1 27 99 1 1 5.25 
Russian Fed. 0 39 95 2 0 7.53 
Serbia 1 25 92 2 0 3.95 
Singapore 0 20 8 3 0 8.48 
Slovakia 1 52 51 2 1 4.64 
Slovenia 1 27 88 3 1 3.87 
Spain 1 51 86 2 1 5.54 
Sweden 1 71 29 1 1 4.73 
Switzerland 1 68 58 1 1 6.03 
Taiwan 0 17 69 2 1 5.55 
Thailand 0 20 64 2 0 6.11 
United Kingdom 1 89 35 4 1 6 
  
 
The second column identifies if it is a European 
or Asian county. The third and fourth columns show 
the measures for our two dimensions of culture, 
IDV and UAI. The fifth to seventh columns shows 
the indexes for our country specific variable 
controls as defined in Table 2. The last two columns 
show the number of banks and bank-year 
observations assigned to each country included in 
our sample. 
 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the 
continuous variables used in our multivariate 
analyses. The mean (median) of loan losses 
provisions is about 8% of the market capitalization 
of the bank. The negative minimum values reveal 
that in some bank-year observations the bank 
recorded reversals higher than the recorded 
provision in the income statement.  
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Table 4 - Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
 
  LLP NPL BegNPL ΔNPL 
Mean 0.0895965 0.7713293 0.6481556 0.1226448 
Median 0.0401544 0.2939879 0.2794175 0.0000001 
Std. Deviation 0.1630924 2.853.858 2.185.411 19.575.962 
Minimum -1.104.033 0.00000 0.00000 -2.234.643 
Maximum 1.969.466 7.061.092 7.061.092 6.275.361 
p25 0.01319133 0.0938559 0.0920613 -.0462622 
p50 0.04015445 0.2939879 0.2794175 0.0000001 
p75 0.10134127 0.7030076 0.6534656 0.0802906 
N 2,392 2,389 2,392 2,389 
Note: See definition of variables in Table 2. 
 
Table 5, Panel A shows Pearson correlations 
between the LLP and the continuous independent 
and control variables; Panel B presents the 
Spearman rank correlations between LLP and 
categorical or binary control variables and macro 
and country specific variables. Loan Loss provisions 
(LLP) have a positive correlation with non-
performing loans, either the beginning (BegNPL) or 
the change (ΔNPL) at the year. This in in the line 
with the way as LLP is estimated according to 
accounting standards or Basel Agreements. The 
correlation between LLP and the variables of 
national culture (UAI and IDV), geographies 
(Europe) and accounting regimes (IFRS) are 
significantly positive suggesting that banks in 
Europe, or applying IFRSs, or with higher scores of 
IDV or UAI have higher amount of LLP. The 
relation between IDV with LLP and UAI would be 
opposite according to Hofstede’s theory.  
 
Table 5 - Pearson and Spearman rank correlation
Panel A: Pearson correlations between loan loss provisions and continuous variables 
    LLP BegNPL ΔNPL Size LEV LTD 
     LLP 1           
     BegNPL 0.268** 1         
     ΔNPL 0.268** -0.055** 1       
     Size -0.025 -0.016 0.012 1     
     LEV 0.071** 0.108** 0.025 0.341** 1   
     LTD 0.134** 0.043* 0.052* 0.087** -0.024 1 
      
Panel B: Spearman correlations between loan loss provisions and categorical and binary variables 
   LLP IDV UAI IFRS Europe AUD XLIST CR IS ENFORCE LGPD 
LLP 1.000                     
IDV 0.047* 1.000                   
UAI 0.060** -0.034 1.000                 
IFRS 0.131** 0.417** -0.031 1.000               
Europe 0.049* 0.758** 0.024 0.668** 1.000             
AUD -0.113** -0.077** 0.310** 0.235** 0.264** 1.000           
XLIST -0.108** 0.193** 0.000 -0.033 0.131** 0.020 1.000         
CR 0.087** -0.031 -0.254** -0.168** -0.240** -0.037 -0.060** 1.000       
IS -0.083** 0.104** 0.316** 0.082** 0.274** 0.520** 0.033 -0.064** 1.000     
ENFORCE -0.153** -0.066** 0.187** 0.080** 0.046* 0.518** -0.013 0.170** 0.257** 1.000   
LGPD -0.200** 0.259** 0.429** -0.067** 0.187** 0.495** 0.114** 0.155** 0.629** 0.668** 1.000 
Note: See definition of variables in Table 2. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
         * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).                  
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4 Results 
 
Testing the culture dimension between groups  
I start by examining whether loan loss provisions 
(LLP) and selected independent variables (NPL, 
BegNPL and ΔNPL) are similar or different 
between independent groups. Table 6 presents the 
findings. Panel A exposes the outcome for Mann-
Whitney U test comparing the median between 
unrelated groups: i) accounting regimes (IFRSs 
versus local GAAP); ii) geographies (Europe versus 
Asia).  Findings show that there is enough evidence 
to conclude that there is a difference in the median 
of all the variables selected to the test comparing the 
banks applying IFRSs and local GAAP, as well as 
banks in European countries and Asian countries.  
Panel B reveals the outcome for the non-
parametric test comparing the distribution of LLP in 
each Quadrant (figure 1) with the other three 
possible positions in different Quadrants.  
The findings suggest that the median of LLP is 
not equal when IDV is high, regardless of UAI 
being high or low (2nd and 4rd quadrant of figure 1, 
since the null hypothesis was rejected). By opposite, 
the null of the equality of the medians is retained 
when IDV is low, regardless of UAI being high or 
low (1st and 3rd quadrant of figure 1).  
These findings are important and sustain the 
influence of national culture on the level of LLP 
presented by the banking industry, supporting the 
prior findings of [23] and advancing that banks’ 
risk-taking strategies inherent to characteristics 
associated with individualism seems to more heavily 
justify differences in LLP cross different countries 
than banks’ risk-taking strategies inherent to 
characteristics associated with 
uncertainty/avoidance index.  
 
The effect of culture and of IFRSs on Loan Losses 
Provisions 
Panel A of Table 7 shows the results when LLP is 
used as dependent variable, testing the effect of 
culture on loans less provisions. The findings in the 
panel A include outcomes of Equation (1). 
The coefficients for IDV and for UAI (column 
Hypothesis 1, Equation 1) are negative (β=-0.001) 
and positive (β=0.001), both significant at 1% level, 
as expected, confirming prior results of 
Kanagaretnam et al, 2014. The coefficients for Non-
performing loans (BegNPL and ΔNPL) are also 
positive, consistent with the fact that the higher the 
credit (near) in default, the higher the amount 
expensed as provisions.  
When equation (1) is tested over different 
Quadrants (column Hypothesis 2), through the 2x2 
matrix, the coefficients for IDV and for UAI 
deserve attention. Under the 1st and the 4th 
Quadrants the coefficients on IDV and on UAI are 
consistent with theory, and with prior column. 
However, under the 2nd and 3rd Quadrants, the 
coefficients on IDV and on UAI loose statistical 
significance, whereas the coefficients on the other 
main variables remain consistent with prior finding 
for the pooled sample. This result can be important 
for future research, due to diversity on the position 
of countries according to conflicting scores for 
culture behavior. Culture seems not playing a role 
when the scores for IDV and UAI are both either 
low or high. 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Non-parametric test to compare independent groups 
 
Panel A: Loans loss provisions and non-performing loans across different geographies and accounting regimes 
     Non-parametric tests: Independent-samples Mann-Whitney U test 
  Accounting regimes   Geographies IFRS vs local GAAP Europe vs Asia  
  Sig. Decision   Sig. Decision 
The distribution of LLP is the same 0.000 Reject the null    0,017 Reject the null 
The distribution of ΔNPL is the same 0.000 Reject the null   0,014 Reject the null 
The distribution of BegNPL is the same 0.000 Reject the null   0 Reject the null 
The distribution of NPL is the same 0.000 Reject the null   0 Reject the null 
     (Cont.) 
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(cont.) 
Panel B: loans loss provisions across different categories of national culture  
Quadrant (figure 1) 
Non-parametric tests: Independent-
samples Mann-Whitney U test   
 
 
Distribution of LLP according 
to  national culture 
 Sig. Decision 
 1st: Low IDV & High UAI 
 0.923 Retain the null 
 Vs 
 other categories 
 2nd: High IDV & High UA 
 0.000 Reject the null 
 Vs 
 other categories I 
 3rd: Low IDV & Low UAI 
 0.564 Retain the null 
 Vs 
 other categories 
 4th: High IDV & Low UAI 
 0.000 Reject the null 
 Vs 
 other categories 
 Note: See definition of variables in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Results  
Panel B: Relation between national culture and loan loss provisions  
 Hypothesis 1  Hypothesis 2 
 
Equation (1) 
 Equation (1) - split 
   
QUADRANT=1st and 4th 
High IDV & Low UAI 
Low IDV & High UAI  
  
QUADRANT=2nd and 3rd 
High IDV & High UAI  
Low IDV and Low UAI 
  Coef. t-test p-value  Coef. t-test p-value   Coef. t-test p-value 
(Constant) -.341 -3.709 .000  .051 .377 .706   -.207 -2.159 .031 
IDV -.001 -3.385 .001   -.002  -4.432 .000     .000 0.588   .557 
UAI .001 5.325 .000   .001  1.680 .093     .000  0.783  .434 
BegNPL .019 13.407 .000  .026 6.180 .000   .018 13.106 .000 
ΔNPL .021 13.663 .000  .031 7.349 .000   .018 12.069 .000 
SIZE -.008 -1.821 .069  -.015 -2.035 .042   -.016 -2.425 .015 
LEV .556 5.138 .000  .285 1.657 .098   1.362 7.885 .000 
AUD -.014 -1.101 .271  .011 .427 .005   .005 .311 .775 
XLIST -.014 -1.700 .089  -.015 -1.292 .197   -.001 -0.082 .935 
LTD .019 3.731 .000  .020 3.970 .000   .022 4.130 .000 
CR .039 7.711 .000  .065 7.653 .000   .031 6.837 .000 
IS .019 1.663 .097  -1.162 -3.960 .000   .027 2.079 .038 
ENFORCE -.002 -.627 .531  -.031 -3.359 .001   .001 .206 .837 
LGPD -.022 -4.225 .000  .010 1.186 .232   -.009 -1.022 .307 
EUROPE .094 7.995 .000  .133 7.443 .000   .026 1.070 .285 
YEAR  Included  Included   Included 
Adjusted R2 0.223  0.196   0.215 
N. observations 2,387  1,290   1,097 
             
(Cont.) 
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(Cont.) 
Panel B: Relation between national culture and loan loss provisions interacted with the application of IFRS 
  Hypothesis 3 
 Equation (2)  
Equation (2) - split 
   QUADRANT=1st and 4th    QUADRANT=2nd and 3rd 
  Coef. t-test p-value  Coef. t-test p-value   Coef. t-test p-value 
(Constant) -.334 -3.570 .000  -.321 -3.444 .001   -1.157 -6.790 .000 
IDV -.001 -2.934 .003   .003 2.626  .009     -0.001 -.751   .453 
UAI .001 2.100 .036   -.005  -4.910  .001    .002 2.606  .009  
IFRS -.042 -1.638 .102  -.230 -2.372 .018   -0.013 -.303 .762 
IFRS*IDV .000 1.488 .137   .001  1.389  .165   .003  2.753  .006  
IFRS*UAI .001 1.823 .068   .003 2.742   .006   -.002  3.145  .002  
BegNPL  .019 13.354   .000   .024  5.674  .000   .017 12.452 .000 
ΔNPL .021 13.34 .000  .030 7.096 .000  .018 11.710 .000 
SIZE -.011 -2.293 .022  -.020 -2.678 .000   -.012 -1.735 .083 
LEV .626 5.607 .000  .315 1.848 .065   1.436 8.240 .000 
AUD -.016 -1.224 .221  .019 .744 .457   -.011 -.678 .498 
XLIST -.013 -1.581 .114  -.008 -.686 .493   .008 -.710 .478 
LTD -.015 -1.152 .250  -.004 -.355 .723   .006 .482 .630 
CR .035 6.689 .000  .010 .808 .419   .004 .523 .601 
IS .021 1.718 .086  -.046 -.947 .344   .026 1.771 .077 
ENFORCE -.001 -2.083 .777  .000 -0.017 .987   .000 -.007 .995 
LGPD -.019 -3.411 .001  -.003 -.266 .790   -.006 -.537 .591 
EUROPE .076 4.768 .000  .163 3.581 .000   .084 2.753 .006 
YEAR  Included  Included   Included 
Adjusted R2 0.220  0.219   0.36 
N. observations 2,387  1,290   1,097 
Note: See definition of variables in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Panel B presents the relation between national 
culture and loan loss provisions interacted with the 
application of IFRSs by European and Asian Banks 
based on Equation (2), an extended version of 
Equation (1). 
The column entitled Equation (2) reports similar 
results as equation (1): i) the coefficients on IND 
and UAI are negatively and positively associated 
with LLP respectively; ii) the variables on 
Nonperformance loans ((BegNPL and ΔNPL) are 
also consistent with Panel A. The dummy variable 
IFRS and interaction with IND are not statistically 
significant, being statistical significant for UAI at 
10% level, reinforcing the positive association of 
UAI with LLP when Banks apply IFRS. This is 
consistent with the role of IFRS, because IAS 39 
forces the recognition of provisions (impairments) 
over the amount of loans near to default. 
The column entitled Equation (2) – split is of 
extreme importance, given the application of this 
Equation to countries in different Quadrants, using a 
similar methodology as in Panel B. Under the 1st 
and the 4th Quadrants the coefficients on IDV 
(β=0.003) and on UAI (β=-0.005) are the opposite 
from prior column, from Panel A, and from the 
theory, whereas IFRS plays a determinant role. If 
the use of IFRS is included in the model, the 
association of IND (UAI) with LLP changes from 
negative (positive) to positive (negative). This 
finding can be interpreted as the role of IFRS 
moderating the behavior of the Banking industry 
around the concession of credit of bad or good 
quality, assuming requirements dealing with the 
recognition of more, or less, losses on LLP. In fact, 
when IDV is high (more risky) the amounts of LLP 
are also high due to the presence of IFRS requiring 
the recognition of impairment and losses. 
Consistently, if UAI is low - meaning Banks are 
risky- the IFRS increases the association with LLP 
forcing the recognition of losses on loans near 
default. 
The application of Equation (2) to 2nd and 3rd 
Quadrant of the 2x2 matrix is also of interest for 
researchers. In these Quadrants the coefficient for 
IDV is not statistical significant, but the interaction 
with IFRS is positive, meaning, as previously, that 
IFRS forces the recognition of LLP when IDV is 
high (which, consistent with theory, would mean a 
lower amount of LLP). Concerning UAI, either high 
or low in these two Quadrants, the positive effect 
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with LLP is mitigated with the use of IFRS, which 
can be claimed as a tentative of international 
accounting standards to require an adequate amount 
of LLP avoiding hidden reserves or losses when 
companies are higher adverse to risk.. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I examined the influence of national 
culture on credit risk behavior assumed by banks 
using loan loss provisions as a proxy. I find that 
national culture plays a role, as discussed in prior 
literature (e.g, Chen et al, 2015; Kanagaretnam, 
2014). However, this role is different if we analyze 
banks that are positioned in four different positions, 
namely, low individualism and high 
uncertainty/avoidance index (1st quadrant) , high 
individualism and high uncertainty/avoidance index 
(2nd quadrant), low individualism and low 
uncertainty/avoidance index (3rd quadrant), and high 
individualism an d low uncertainty/avoidance index 
(4th quadrant). Findings show that when 
characteristics and behavior attributable to national 
culture is conflicting (namely, low (high) scores of 
IDV (UAI) and simultaneously  low (high) scores of 
UAI (IDV)), the influence of culture on loan loss 
provisions is rejected, controlling for banking 
specific characteristics as well as macro and country 
specific attributes. Further, additional analyses were 
performed in order to test whether the influence of 
the use of IFRSs (versus local GAAP) has a role on 
the moderation of the influence of national culture 
on loan loss provisions. The role of IFRS is better 
captured when countries are split between different 
Quadrants according to consistent or conflicting 
scores for individualism and uncertainty avoidance. 
Results found that the interactions of these variables 
with the application of IFRS can change the sign of 
their association with LLP in all the Quadrants, 
moderating the behavior of the Banking industry 
around the concession of credit of bad or good 
quality, assuming requirements dealing with the 
recognition of adequate amounts of LLP, to avoid 
hidden reserves or overvalued loans. 
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